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Observationally alike individuals who make different choices
about on—the—job investments should have earnings profiles that
differ in systematic ways.In particular, investments in non-
specific human capital should result in lower initial earnings
but higher earnings growth rates. Human capital models of this
sort admit testing, then, by examining the covariance between
the level of earnings and the growth rate of earnings. This
paper reports estimates of this covariance using the sample
covariance among income observations across time for the same
individuals. The sample covariances are drawn from the Utah
Panel Data, a panel of some 16,000 households with income and
wealth observations at various intervals over the period from
1850 to 1900. The parameter of interest is negative. This
estimate is robust to various specifications of the model.I
also reexamine earlier work by Lillard and Weiss and Hause, who
use data on earnings, and conclude that there is strong support
for the on—the—job investment hypothesis using data from three







Age-related profiles in earnings or income are among the most
robust regularities in economic data. However, the interpretation of
these profiles in either cross sectional or longitudinal data is
problematic. In a cross section, age and cohort effects are difficult
to disentargie; in longitudinal data, age and economic growth effects
are difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless, the inverted-U shape has
usually been interpreted as reflecting growing individual productivity
with experience and other kinds of investments in human capital,
followed by the depreciation, obsolescence and declining physical and
mental abilities that accompany aging.
Initial investment in human capital increases average earnings at
any given age and may change the shape of the time related profile as
well. For example, Mincer (1974) found a positive association between
schooling attainment and the slope of the mean age-earnings profile and
between schooling attainment and the length of time over which the
profile has a positive slope.
In general, initial investments in human capital are thought to
occur before employment, usually in a formal schooling environment or at
home. Mincer (1970, 1974), however, has emphasized the investment
possibilities that accompany the initial years in any occupation. It
turns out that the on-the-job training opportunities provide a testable
hypothesis about one aspect of the notion that individuals deliberately
make investments in themselves. Tests of this 'sown" investment
hypothesis using relationships between means were explored by Mincer.
However, tests using individual data, which are more appropriate for the
hypothesis, were developed and explored primarily by Hause (1977, 1980),2
Chamberlain(1978)andLiliard and Weiss (1979) (see also Borjas and
Mincer (1978)).
Tests using panel data are based on a compensatory notion:
observationally equivalent individuals who choose different levels of
on—the—job investment should have systematically different individual
time—related earnings or income profiles. More specifically,
individuals who "invest" in generalized human capital will have lower
initial earnings as they purchase capital (in the form of training from
their employers but will only make this investment if there is a
compensatory increase in the rate of growth of their earnings over time.
This implies that there should be a negative covariance between early
earnings and the slope of an individual's earnings profile. Differences
in earnings among individuals will be determined, then, by individual
differences in the level of earnings and individual differences in the
growth of earnings.
However, the test is not quite as clear-cut as this suggests since
individual differences in earnings may also reflect differences in
observationally-alike individuals that have nothing to do with
on—the-job investments and everything to do with ability, individual
values, cultural values and other differences that distinguish
individuals but which are difficult to observe and measure. In this
case, earnings differences would reflect permanent differences among
individuals that persisted through time. A negative covariance between
initial earnings and the slope of an earnings profile is consistent with
on—the-job investment in human capital but it may also be that
individuals with lower initial earnings simply work harder and that
there is a negative covariance between initial earnings and subsequent3
effort. It may also be, of course, that higher ebility is reflected
both in initial earnings and in the growth of earnings so that there is
a positive covariance between initial earnings and earnings' growth
reflecting the consequences of underlying ability differences.
Thus, while a negative covariance may reflect things in addition to
choices about on-the-job investments, a positive covariance between the
level of earnings and the growth rate in earnings would be a clear
refutation of a compensatory behavioral model.
Possible compensatory individual earnings profiles are also
important because they imply that the cross-sectional variance in
earnings or income, a measure of "inequality," reflects different
choices made by otherwise similar individuals as well as stochastic
elements and persistent individual dissimilarities. This gives rise to
the much debated issue of measuring the 'true" inequality in a
population where the measured inequality using observable earnings or
income does not reflect (generally overestimating) actual disparities in
economic position. That is, compensatory profiles imply a lower
variance in lifetime earnings than in annual earnings.
Whatever its limitations, a compensatory model of individual
earnings is an appealing explanation of the age or experience-related
pattern in earnings and important in our understanding of the underlying
distributional dynamics in an economy. Despite the appeal of the
covariance test, the empirical evidence is mixed. Mincer could not
directly test the hypothesis since his data only allowed for
comparisions of means. However, he found that for less schooled groups,
there exists a longer initial period during which persons with greater
earnings growth have lower earnings. In another indirect test, Borjas4
and Mincer conclude that individuals who make larger investments have
lower initial earnings which, in turn, grow more rapidly than others.
Similarly, Lillard (1977) found that both the more able and the
more schooled were compensated by more rapidly rising earnings and by
higher earnings later in their lives. Hause (1977) provides an indirect
test using Swedish data. He found substantial systematic dispersion in
earnings profiles for workers of the same age when education is factored
out. He also found that discounted lifetime earnings had a
substantially lower variance than did annual earnings (Lillard's
analysis also supports this conclusion).
Chamberlain (1978), in a paper primarily focused on the biases in
estimating returns to education, found a substantial variance in the
growth rates of individual earnings and a large negative correlation
between initial earnings and subsequence growth rates.
In later work, Hause and Lillard and Weiss directly confronted the
possibilities of individual compensatory behavior. Hause (1980) used
the sample covariance of earnings obtainable from Swedish panel data to
estimate directly the covariance between initial earnings and earnings
growth. The estimated model suggests that the on-the-job investment
hypothesis is an empirically significant phenomenon. The data exhibit a
negative covariance between the level of individual earnings and the
slope of individual earnings profiles. The sign of this critical
covariance is robust to a variety of specifications with complex error
generating mechanisms. However, statistical significance is not robust
and the variance of the individual slopes is small, indicating that the
sample is quite homogeneous. In addition, the models of the error
process that generate statistical significance for the covariancebetween slopes and intercepts have serious problems elsewhere that make
them less credible.
Lillard and Weiss (197°" provide evidence from a panel of
scientists that is not consistent with the on—the—job training
hypothesis. When the effects of observed characteristics on earnings
are controlled for, there is a positive correlation between the level of
individual earnings (intercepts) and the growth rate of the individual
earnings profiles (slopes). As Lillard and Weiss note "(the positive
covariarce between the level and growth error components indicates that
for scientists who are observationally alike, high average earnings is
associated with high growth. .." (page445'.
Since differences in the level and growth of earnings could arise
either because of ability differences which increase both initial
earnings and growth rates or because of investment patterns that tend to
lower initial earnings while raising the subsequent growth rate, Lillard
and Weiss speculate that for scientists, ability differences drive the
observed relationship between initial earnings and subsequent growth
rates instead of compensatory behavior. They conclude: "We find
diverging earnings development over the decade among observationally
alike individuals. That is, individuals with greater mean earnings also
had greater earnings growth" (p 437'.
It turns out that computational errors apparently lead to the wrong
sign on the crucial parameter in the Lillard and Weiss analysis.
Reestimating their model, using the residual variance-covariance matrix
published with their paper, provides evidence that is consistent with an
on-the-job investment or compensatory model and to conclusions quite
different from those noted above. Indeed, there is strong evidence that.6
the covariance is negative and mostly unaffected by the problems
associated with modelling the error process in data used by Hause and by
Lillard arid Weiss. Section II deals with these issues.
I provide additional evidence about the covariance structure of
earnings and income by examining data from a quite different era, the
19th century, in which on—the—job training is likely to be relatively
quite important since formal schooling was less widespread than it is
today. Following the specification of an error components model
suitable for testing the relationship between the level of individual
income and subsequent individual growth rates (Section I), I provide
tests of a simple model in Section III. Since most of the previous work
has been done with data sets of fairly short duration and the data that
I use extends over the lifetime of many of the individuals in the
sample, I then provide estimates of a more complex model that allows us
to examine more of the age—income profile and, in particular, what
happens to individual profiles past the typical peak in the inverted U.
I. Compensatory Behavior and the Covariance of Earnings
We assume that the aggregate or mean age-earnings pattern (what
Hause (1980) calls the coarse structure of earnings) can be described by
a regression of the logarithm of earnings on a quadratic in age, g(A,6),
with intercept differences depending upon observed individual character-
istics, f(C,), such as occupation, gender, place of birth, etc,
(1) ln y =f(C,)+g(A,+u,
where i, i =1,N,indexes observations on individuals, t, t =1,T,
indexes observations through time andis a vector of parameters.
This coarse structure, developed first by Ben—Porath (1967), has
been explored extensively by Mincer (1974) and many others. Elsewhere7
we have examined age-income and age-wealth profiles more carefully using
data from the Utah Panel and have examined possible interactions between
individual characteristics and age and nonlinearities inage that are
not allowed for with a simple quadratic specification (Kearl and Pope,
1984a, 1984b and 1985').
What 1-fause (1980) calls the fine structure of earnings is embodied
in the specification of the structure of u. For example, if we allow
for individual error components ()andindividual time dependent error
components ()plusa purely random error
(2) i +(t
—1')+
Theerror structure for a sample with observations through
time on the same individuals would be,








with corresponding variance—covariance structure,
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Then, if S is the sample variance-covariance matrix and
2 2 2 (6) a =a a 1 V \)3
the model can be estimated with a panel having three or more
observations on each individual. For example, if I =3,
(7) =13
-12









isoveridentified. The individual time-invariant variance component is
23
and the truly random component is also overidentified
(10) 2 = - = s22--- 2=
s33
-2-42-4
The model remains identified if
(11) 2 2
1 V2 V3
Thissimple model is not identified with a two-observation panel
since there are four parameters (a, a, a, a) but only three
independent pieces of information (S11, i2' S22).
With at least three observations on each individual, some of the
parameters are overidentified since there are now at least six
independent pieces of information about the covariance structure,
(S11, S22, S33, S12, S13, S23, .. .). Thisallows for a richer
specification of the covariance structure or for a more complex
structure for Lillard and Weiss (1979), Hause (1980 and
Chamberlain (1978 have all estimated models with more complex
structures for Vjt. Lillard and Weiss estimate a first order9
autoregressive model where the uncorrelated random element is drawn from
a distribution with constant variance through time. Hause estimates a
model with a non-stationary autoregressive structure where the period by
period innovations have independent or time-varying variances.
Chamberlain assumes time-invariant variances for the random element but
estimates a more complex two-factor model with time varying parameters
(or heterogeneity) which he interprets to be the time-varying shadow
prices of unobserved individual characteristics.
The structure ofit poses a problem in all the empirical results,
including our own. As we note below, models with time-varying error
variances, that is, where
(12) it f(O, a
dominate models where the error variance is assumed to be drawn from a
distribution with a constant variance across time. However, there is no
clear pattern in the error variances and hence, no easily generalizable
observations.
Since complex structures for'jt are mostly uninformative, it seems
useful to consider a richer specification of the "behavioral" part of
the unobservable. Chamberlain's two-factor model is one approach.
Within a variance components structure, we consider a model that allows
for a more complete individual life cycle by allowing for curvature,
(13) =+ (t-1)+a(t
- + vie.
Thismodel, with seven possible parameters, (o, o,,a, a,
and),isidentified with a panel having four or more observations on
each household.
In a simple model with level and slope effects, one can easily10
solve for the point at which the variance is minimized. The value





Ifobservationally alike individuals make different on—the-job
investments, their respective individual age— (or experience-) earnings
profiles must cross. While there is no reason that the individual
profiles for a population should cross at the same point, Mincer derives
an upper bound for the crossover or "overtaking" point of 1/r, where r
is the return to on—the-job investments. The importance of the
"overtaking" point or region is that it provides a closer estimate to
the underlying inequality associated with individual differences that
are not the outcome of individual choices. That is, if all profiles did
cross at the same point, the variance in earnings at that point would
reflect persistent individual differences that are not related to
individual intertemporal choices about investment in earning
potential. a is biased upward as a measure of such inequality
because part of the variance is attributable to compensatory choices
that individuals make.
Hause provides an argument for tmjn as the lower bound for the
"overtaking" point when ability cannot be directly measured and when the
random component, it' is drawn from a stationary distribution.
II. Estimates from Hause and Lillard and Weiss
Papers by Hause (1980') and Lillard and Weiss (1979) are the most
ambitious efforts to estimate models that allow for compensatory11.
behavior. Hause estimates a covariance structure for log earnings but
does not have observations on individual characteristics and cannot
estimate the covariance structure of the residuals, that is, his results
of earnings less the effects of observed individual characteristics
weakly support the compensatory hypothesis. Lillard and Weiss estimate
the covariance structure for log earnings and for the residuals from a
regression of log earnings on observed individual characteristics.
Their results are inconsistent with the compensatory hypothesis since
the covariance between the level and growth rate of earnings is
positive.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table I partially reproduce Hause's estimates.
(All of the reported covariance models are estimated with maximum like-
lihood techniques using LISREL.) The asymptotic statistic tests the
specified model as the null hypothesis against the hypothesis that the
sample variance-covariarice matrix is any positive definite matrix of the
same dimensions. While the null hypothesis is often rejected,
differences in x2 statistics are sometimes useful for comparing models.
Joreskog and Sorbom (1980) show that for nested models, the difference
between the asymptotic x2 of the models is itself asymptotically with
degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the degrees of
freedom of the two models.
When Hause allows for a complex error structure, where each
period's error is drawn from a distribution with time-varying variances
and where there is a period-specific autocorrelation (column 6,
reproduced from Hause without the autocorrelation estimates', none of
the parameters of interest are significant. The covariance between the
initial earnings, ,andearnings growth, ,a,
hasa negative sign12
(-.00245) but a standard error that is nearly 50 percent larger than the
coeffici ent.
A less complex error structure, with a constant autocorrelation
across time and only the first period's error drawn from a distribution
with a different variance than the remaining five periods, produces
parameter estimates for the variance components that are substantially
larger than their standard errors and of a sign consistent with a com-
pensatory model of investment. For this model, is -.0091 with a
standard error about one quarter the size of the parameter. There is,
however, a very large difference in the x2 statistics that measure the
goodness of fit of the model to the sample covariance.Indeed, Hause
shows that a purely statistical model of the error process dominates any
model with a covariance structure.
Column 8 of Table I summarizes my estimates of a simple model
using the sample covariance matrix provided in Hause's paper. The
covariance between level and growth components is negative and
statistically "significant" (in the sense that the estimate is almost
10 times the asymptotic standard error) as are the estimated variances
for level, growth and random error components. A covariance model
allowing the error variance to differ from period to period (column 9)
provides a somewhat better fit than the second of Flause's models and a
substantially better fit than a model with a time—invariant error
variance. One can clearly see the large difference between the first
period's error and subsequent period's errors which decline slowly
consistent with simple autocorrelation, patterns that are reflected in
the parameter estimates in Hause's second model. However,
the parameter estimates for a, o and are virtually unaffected by13
the change inspecifications.
The complex error structure tells us little about the behavior that
generated the sample covariance. It can be, as we noted, estimated with
a much simpler model (where the error structure is, obviously, equally
unrevealing) that is 'closer" to the explanatory power of Hause's first
model. In this case, the variance components associated with the on—
the—job investment model are more precisely estimated (column 9). When
we allow for time—varying error variances, the variance in growth rates
is substantially higher than in Hause's second model (.003 versus
.0018). While the covariance between level and growth components
remains about the same (-.009), the correlation between these components
decl ines somewhat.
Reestimating Lillard and Weiss's model, using the sample covariance
matrices published with their article, provides a quite different
interpretation of their data. Columns 1 and 3 of Table I are reproduced
from Lillard and Weiss's Table II.In neither case is the critical
parameter, a, negative. However, if the models summarized in 1 and 3
are reestiniated, columns 2 and 4, all of the parameters are very close
to those reported by Lillard and Weiss except for which is now
negative. Comparing columns I and 2, there are very small differences
in the new estimates of a, a, 2 and and each retains about the
same level of "significance" as in the results reported by Lillard and
Weiss. However, changes substantially, from .00101 to -.0006, and
the interpretation of the earnings covariance structure is completely
cN fferent.
It does not matter whether or not autocorrelation is modelled
(compare columns 3 and 4), remains negative and from 7.5 to 1114
times its standard error. The Lillard-Weiss data are consistent with a
compensatory model of behavior even when the effects of observed
characteristics are considered.
Estimates of a model using the Lillard—Weiss data where the errors
are drawn from distributions with time-varying variances loosely
analogous to Hause's more complex error structure (columns 6, 7 or 9).
They are reported in column 5. The parameter estimates of interest do
not change much, but remain consistent with a compensatory model and are
"significant. This model, based on difference in x2 statistics, is a
much better fit of the data than either of the models reported in
columns 1 and 2 or 3 and 4.(The x2 statistic is 357 with 12 degrees of
freedom compared with a x statistic in the range of 700 with 16 degrees
of freedom.)
The estimates of the time-varying errors do not, in contrast to
Hause, evidence any easily detected pattern.
I have also estimated a model for the Lillard-Weiss data that
allows for time-varying error variances using the logarithm of earnings
as the dependent variable, Table II, column 3. This is comparable to
the estimates for log earnings by Lillard and Weiss which are reproduced
as column 1, and is niore directly comparable to the Hause estimates.
The model in column 3, with an uninformative error structure to be sure,
dominates column 1 but the parameter estimates are essentially unchanged
from the reestimated Lillard-Weiss model (column 2). Since the signs of
the coefficients correspond to those estimated by Lillard and Weiss, the
model for log earnings retains the same general interpretation they
suggested. However, the covariance between initial earnings and
earnings growth is larger than that estimated by Lillard and Weiss and15
the coefficients differ in relationship to one another. This is
important in estimating the "overtaking point." The change in the
relationship between the variance component associated with growth and
the covariance between growth and initial earnings extends the point of
minimum variance, the "crossover" point, from 1.5 years (using Lillard
and Weiss's estimates) to seven years (using either column 2 or 3').
Hause's data produce a larger correlation between growth and level
variance components for log earnings than do Lillard and Weiss's data,
—.65 (from column 9 of Table I) versus -.52 (from column 3 of Table II,
the reestimated model).
Since the error structure is apparently quite different for the two
samples, there is little that can be generalized from efforts to
estimate the random component(s) differently.Indeed, as noted,
allowing for time-varying error variances for the distributions of the
errors produces a pattern with a large first year variance and smaller
but declining variances in subsequent years in the Hause data and
essentially a U—shaped pattern in the Lillard—Weiss data. However, the
covariance structures in both data sets are consistent with a model of
compensatory behavior.
III. Some Further Evidence from the Utah Panel
The Utah Panel is composed of observations on heads of households
from 1850 to 1900. We have income estimates at five-year intervals and
wealth and occupation estimates at ten-year intervals. In addition, we
know the age of the household head and when that person "entered" the
Utah economy either by migration or by marrying and establishing an
independent household. Households migrate into Utah, leave Utah, are
created and die during the sample period. Thus, we can compose "panels"16
of from two to ten observations per household head for income and from
two to five observations for wealth. The panel sizes range from 10,367
individuals for three consecutive income observations (covering 10
years to 218 individuals for eight consecutive income observations
(covering 36 years). Panels of this sort will be nested. That is, all
persons in a four-consecutive observation panel will also be in a
three-consecutive observation panel and so forth. The data are
described in greater detail in the accompanying appendix.
Detailed analyses of the coarse structures of income and wealth are
found elsewhere (see Kearl and Pope, 1984a, 1984b, and 1985). The
general properties of the log income regressions can be seen in the
following (estimated from a four-observation panel):
ln y =4.58+.0613A -.00067A2 +.031T -.0034FB
(.069' (003) (.00003) (.0025) (.011)
-.091R +.292W -.067C +.049S —.257L





mean log y, 6.27
where A, 1, FB, R, W, C, S and L are age, time within the Utah economy,
foreign birth, residence in a rural area, white—collar, craft, service
and common labor, respectively, and Y2, Y3, and Y4 are dummy variables
for the second, third and fourth observations on the same individual in
the panel. The regression is normalized on farmers who live in the
"urban" county. (The sample is a pooled set of panels; I have omitted
the dummy variables associated with the pooling.)
The data exhibit a pronounced age-income pattern that is concave;
income increases at a decreasinci rate until age 46 and then declines.17
The foreign born and those livino in rural areas have lower incomes than
U.S.-born individuals living in the urban area. Those living in the
economy for a longer period of time have higher incomes than
observationally alike individuals who are more recent immigrants or who
formed households later in the half century covered by our data, perhaps
reflecting Ricardian-type rents.
Occupations are aggregated into five categories, W, C, S, L and F.
The relative effects of a particular are very robust over various
samples and specifications: white—collar workers have incomes
substantially above farmers while common laborers have incomes substan-
tially below farmers. Those identified as craft workers have incomes a
bit below farmers and there is generally no statistical difference
between farmers and those identified as working in services.
I do not have data on earnings, only on income. For many in the
sample, earnings and income will coincide. However, for others, income
will include earnings and returns on capital. Hence, we would expect to
have more noise in income than in earnings relative to the compensatory
model.
Table III provides estimates of the covariance structure for both
log income and the residuals from the regression of log income on the
observed characteristics of the household head, including a quadratic in
age, place of residence, place of birth, time in the Utah economy, and
occupation. (Following Lillard and Weiss, I iointly estimated the
covariance structure and the parameters associated with observed
individual characteristics. The parameter estimates changed very
little. Therefore, I concentrate on the covariance structure and the18
parameters for the jointly estimated coarse structure are essentially
the same as those noted above and reported elsewhere.)
The estimated variance of the individual level effect is generally
about .25 while the variance in growth rates is about .001. There is a
strong negative covariance between individual income levels and growth
rates consistent with compensatory behavior on the part of the
individuals. This crucial parameter is highly significant in every
sample. The correlation between initial income and income growth ranges
prom -.2to-.6.The variance is minimized at three years for the
four—observation panel and at eight years for the eight-observation
panel. These overtaking" points appear reasonable although the large
difference between the two is puzzling.
Although the samples are nested, they differ considerably in size
as individuals are lost to migration, death or our inability to trace
them from year to year. Nevertheless, the covariance structure is quite
stable across the various samples.
When the effects of observed individual characteristics are swept
from log income, the estimated variance of the individual level effect
declines by about 40 percent for the two large samples but by a
considerably smaller amount for the longer but smaller samples (from
about .25 to .19 or by about 25 percentL The decline is to be expected
since, for log income, the individual effect picks up the contributions
of both observed and unobserved individual characteristics while for the
residuals, only the contributions of the unobserved characteristics will
matter. The year by year effects (a loose measure of economic growth
and price changes) are very small since the estimated error variance is
virtually the same for log income as it is for the residuals. That is,19
virtually all of the explained variance is explained by the observed
individual characteristics and very little is explained by the dummy
variables associated with the year of observation. The random error
variance is about 50 percent of the variance in log income; about 10
percent of the variance in log income can be explained by the observed
individual characteristics and the remaining 40 percent is explained by
the "behavioral" part of the covariance structure.
The variance attributed to growth remains the same for residuals as
for log income. However, the covariance between growth and individual
level components declines. Nevertheless, it remains highly significant.
Because both the individual level component and the covariance between
initial income and income growth decline, the correlation between the
two remain essentially in the range noted earlier, from -.2 to -.6.
Table IV provides estimates of the covariance structure when the
error variance is not assumed to be drawn from a time-invariant
distribution. For the short panels, covering from 10 to 20 years, the
estimated error variances exhibit a hump shape, increasing and then
declining. For the longer panels, the estimated error variances bounce
around without a clear pattern. We do not observe a pattern comparable
to that in Hause's data, where the error variance declined with time.
In the Lillard-Weiss data, the error variances decline and then
increase. In any event, the parameter estimates of the "behavioral"
part of the covariance structure are essentially insensitive to the
change in specification.
These data, from a very different economy, are strongly consistent
with an on-the-job investment model of individual behavior. Indeed, even
though the dependent variable is income rather than earnings and, as a20
consequence,there ought to be more variance in the data that is not
associated with compensatory choices, the results are stronger than
those using contemporary data. We might expect, however, that on—the—
job investment was more important in an economy that had limited
opportunities for formal education but which had skilled occupations
than in a contemporary economy, where formal education is widespread.
Hence, the relative importance and significance of the parameter
estimates are not surprising but they provide important additional
evidence consistent with compensatory behavior and the on—the-job
training hypothesis.
Changing Growth Rates
Lillard and Weiss provide some evidence that both the variance in
growth rates and the variance in income levels increases with
experience. We can directly explore the first possibility by
considering a more complex covariance structure where,
(16) u. =. + .(t-1+a.(t - + v. it 1 1 1 it
Themodel is identified so long as the panel has at least four
observations on each individual. The parameters of interest are the
covariances between the earnings/income level and the change in the
growth rate and between the growth rate and the change in the growth
rate.
Table V provides estimates using data from Hause, Lillard and Weiss
and the lJtah Panel for this more complex covariance structure. It turns
out that while I extended the covariance structure in an effort to
capture whatever information was contained in the time—varying error
variances, the more complex covariance structure fails to do this and
models that allow for time-varying error variances dominate those where21
the innovations are assumed to be drawn from a distribution with
constant variance.
Models that allow growth rates
covariance models estimated to this
falls from 94 to 49; for Lillard
from 566 to 213; for their residual
the Utah Panel, falls from 103 to
from 103 to 18 for a six-observation panel.
For every data set, there is a negative covariance between and
that is, between the growth rate and the change in the growth rate in
earnings or income. Since it is likely thatcz.j has a negative sign
(that is, that the life cycle profile is concave), the negative
covariance implies that those individuals having high growth rates have
a greater rate of decline in those growth rates. Since there is a
negative covariance between the level of earnings/income and the growth
rate, those with higher initial earnings/income who have lower growth
rates should also have growth rates that decline more slowly than those
with lower initial earnings. The covariance estimates are consistent
with this since the covariance between the earnings/income level and the
change in growth rate is positive. Comparable results hold for the
Lillard—Weiss and Utah Panel residuals.
Put somewhat differently, the mean life cycle pattern in earnings
and income is a composite of individual life cycle profiles where those
with higher initial earnings (or income) have a flatter profile while
those with lower initial earnings (or income) have a profile that is
initially steeper but which is more concave.
to differ through time dominate the
point. For Hause's earnings data,
and Weiss's earnings data, x2 falls
data, x2 falls from 357 to 72; for
16 for a five—observation panel and22
The individual level variance component does not change much with
the change in specification. However, for each of the samples, the
variance in growth rates is larger with the change in specification
(e.g., for Hause's data, the growth variance component increases from
.003 to 0.18'. The covariance between the level and growth components
is also substantially larger.
The variance in growth rates is substantially higher than that
suguested by previous work. The implied correlations between level and
growth components increase for all samples except the Lillard-Weiss log
earnings data, providing somewhat stronger evidence of compensatory
behavior.
Nothing in the models distinguishing on-the-job investments from
other forms of human capital accumulation suggests that on-the—job
investments should have higher (or lower) rates of depreciation compared
with other kinds of investment. In all three data sets, however, the
effects of the substantially larger variance in growth rates across the
population are tempered by the greater concavity of the earnings/income
profile. This suggests that on-the-job investments depreciate more
rapidly than other forms of human capital that individuals bring with
them to the workplace.
Conclusions
Data from three very different sources are consistent with a
compensatory model of earnings or income differences among individuals.
This does not mean, of course, that on—the-job investment and
compensatory behavior fully explain the observed variance in earnings or
income. A substantial part of the variance is apparently stochastic and
another large part can be attributed to individual differences that are23
probably associated with ability. However, individual differences in
growth rates and in changes in growth rates are important as well and
are consistent with on—the-job investment. The observed consistency is
robust to a variety to underlying stochastic processes that may
contribute to the observed variance. Moreover, the consistency is
robust in samples from different places, periods of time and covering
different age spreads among individuals.
It is particularly interesting that we find compensatory behavior
where it might be expected, in an economy with little reliance on formal
education, and yet where the economy is quite different from a
contemporary industrial economy.
We also find that there is good evidence that growth rates vary
depending upon both the level of earnings/income and the growth rate
itself. Models that allow for growth rates to vary for individuals
across time appear to dominate those with simpler covariance structures.
In addition, the variance in growth rates across individuals at a moment
of time varies a good deal more than simpler models suggest.
It is, of course, not possible to tell if the discounted
earnings/income are greater or less with the difference in the concavity
of the age—earnings or age-income profile, but the data suggest that
there is faster depreciation in capital acquired on the job.24
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L—W L-W Hause Hause Table II Table II Table ITable I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 .0321 .030 .0334 .0334 .033 .027 .07536.067 .064
(.00077) (.0009) (.00077) (.0008) (.0009) (.021)(.0121) (.007) (.007)
.00031 .0003 .00038.00038 .00036 .00091 .0018 .0031 .003
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.0000l3)(.00085) (.00046) (.0004) (.0004)
a .00101-.0006 .00092 -.00091 -.0008-.00245 -.0091-.011-.009
(.00007) (.00008) (.00007) (.00008) (.00008) (.00350) (.00217) (.0014) (.0014)
.188 .19 ** .202
(.013) (.013) (.04)
*a2a.01482 .015 .01317 .013 .012 -.0898 .0876 .025 .074
(.00021) (.0002) (.00014) (.00014) (.0004) (.00163) (.0103) (.0011) (.008)
.013 .0498 .0207 .029
(.0004) (.0059) (.0013) (.003)
a2 .010 .0290 .022
V3 (.0003) .00280) (.002)
a2 .0094 .0286 .017
(.0003) (.0031) (.002)
.0165 .0179 .013 V5 (.0005)(.0042) (.002)
.022 .0105 .009
V6 (.0007)(.0069) (.002)
746.28 720 917.6 923 357 7.22111.4 290 94
df. 16 16 17 17 12 7 15 17 12
4
*a =(11),2o, otherwise, a =1.
1-i
**indjvjdual were estimated for each year.
Note: Columns 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9 have been restricted using the published data in
Hause or Lillard and Weiss. Column 1, 3, 6 and 7 are reproduced from the estimates



























df. 15 17 12
Note: Columns 2 and 3 are estimated using the data published in Lillard and Weiss
while Column 1 is reproduced from the estimates reported in Lillard and Weiss.28
TableIII
LnIncome Residuals
Panel Size (#ofobservations at 5—year intervals)
4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
a2 .257 .190 .242 .246 .250 .154 .14 .194 .196 .193
(.009) (.011) (.019) (.025) (.035) (.008) (.009) (.016)(.022) (.020)
.002 .001 .001 .0006 .001 .001 .001 .001 .0005 .001
(.0001) (.00008) (.0001) (.00007) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00006)(.0002)
a -.006 -.003 -.006 -.008 -.009 -.001 -.001 -.004 -.005 -.007
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.001)
.33 .31 .285 .266 .265 .33 .31 .285 .267 .26




172 181 124 94 111 184 218 142 108 91
df. 6 11 17 24 32 6 11 17 24 32
# 5761 2794 925 444 218 5761 2794 925 444 21829
Table IV
Ln Income Residuals
Panel Size (#ofobservations at 5-year intervals)
4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
2
.245 .212 .238 .232 .223 .213 .163 .193 .184 .195
(.01) (.01) (.019) (.025) (.035) (.009) (.01) (.017)(.022) (.003)
2
.002 .001 .001 .0006 .001 .001 .001 .001 .0005 .001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00005) (.0001) (.00006)(.0002)
o -.005 -.005 -.006 -.007 -.008 -.003 -.003 -.004 -.005-.006
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.00098)(.001)
.24 .245 .32 .30 .27 .24 .24 .31 .27 .26
'1 (.009) (.01) (.02) (.029) (.04) (.009) (.01) (.02) (.026) (.04)
2
.298 .27 .31 .35 .33 .297 .28 .309 .33
'2 (.008) (.01) (.02) (.026) (.04) (.007) (.009) (.016) (.025) (.04)
.39 .383 .33 .31 .39 .38 .387 .33 .325 .35
V3(.009) (.01) (.02) (.024) (.04) (.009) (.01) (.017) (.025) (.04)
.28 .323 .28 .289 .29 .30 .33 .30 .298 .29
\)4 (.012) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.012) (.01) (.016) (.022) (.03)
2 .270 .25 .213 .19 .256 .26 .219 .21
(.01) (.02) (.017) (.02) (.01) (.015)(.018) (.02)
2
.25 .211 .19 .23 .211 .20
(.02) (.019) (.03) (.017) (.019) (.02)
.228 .19 .226 .21
V7 (.024) (.02) (.024) (.03)
a2 .26 .26
(.04) (.04)
43 103 103 66 68 44 118 120 79 67
df. 3 7 12 18 25 3 7 12 18 25
5761 2794 925 444 218 5761 2794 925 444 2183
TableV
Lii Earnings/Income Residuals
Lillard- Utah Utah Utah Lillard—Utah Utah Utah
Hause Weiss 4 obs 5 obs 6 obs Weiss 4 obs 5 obs 6 obs
.069 .087 .274 .258 .258 .035 .23 .20 .195
(.009) (.002) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.001) (.02) (.018) (.026)
2
.018 .002 .007 .005 .0047 .00151 .007 .006 .004
(.004) (.0001) (.001) (.0007) (.0007) (.00009) (.001) (.0007) (.0007)
a - .0199 -.0051 -.125 -.0133-.0134-.0018 -.012 -.0125 -.009
(.005) (.00035)(.005) (.003) (.004) (.00025) (.005) (.003) (.004)
2
.00047 .00001 .00002 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00002 .00001 .000006 a
(.00009)(.000007) (.00004) (.000001)(.000001)(.000001)(.00004) (.000001) (.000001)
a .00183 .0001 .00034 .00037.00025 .00007 .0004 .00036 .0002 °
(.0007)(.00003) (.00025) (.00013) (.00013) (.00002) (.00025) (.0001) (.00004)
a - .00269-.00014-.00034-.00023 -.00016-.00011 -.00034 -.00023 -.00016 a (.0006) (.00001) (.00007) (.00003) (.00002) (.00001) (.00007) (.00003) (.00002)
.052 .0085 .204 .19 .26 .007 .193 .184 .26
(.008) (.0007) (.023) (.02) (.03) (.0006) (.02) (.018) (.027)
.029 .0017 .305 .28 .27 .013 .30 .278 .27
(.003) (.0004) (.009) (.01) (.02) (.0004) (.009) (.010) (.016)
.021 .009 .369 .34 .28 .009 .358 .333 .33
(.002) (.0003) (.010) (.01) (.02) (.0003) (.010) (.012) (.019)
.013 .006 .238 .31 .24 .008 .264 .317 .25
(.002) (.0002) (.029) (.01) (.02) (.008) (.029) (.012) (.016)
a2 .012 .019 .22 .25 .017 .208 .26
V5(.002) (.0005) (.02) (.02) (.0005) (.022) (.015)
.003 .018 .15 .017 .15
(.003) (.0009) (.03) (.0009) (.025)
49 213 0 17.5 18 72 0 19 18.7
df. 9 9 0 4 9 9 0 4 9
279 4330 5761 2794 925 4330 5761 2794 925APPENDIX
The Utah Panel
Our data are drawn from some or all of the following sources:
census manuscripts of 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, and 1900; tax assessment
records of 1870, 1880, 1890, and 1900; financial records of the LDS
Church for 1855, 1857, 1859, 1861, 1866, 1870, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890,
1895, 1900; and family vital records from the Genealogical Library of
the LDS Church.
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1850, 1860, and 1870 and from tax assessment records for 1870, 1880,
1890,and 1900. We sampled from both records in 1870in order to splice
thewealth series from 1850 to 1900 at decade intervals. Both tax
assessment and census records provide estimates of gross rather than net
wealth.
Income estimates are obtained from the financial records of the LDS
Church for the 12 years noted earlier. Essentially we cover five-year
intervals from 1855 to 1900. LDS financial records indicate the
contribution an individual made to the Church. Church members accepted
the moral obligation to contribute a tithe——ten percent of one's income.
In eight of the twelve sample years we have a record of the percentage
that an individual's contribution was relative to this full tithe.
These assessments of tithing paid versus tithing owed were made by local
Church leaders who would personally know the individual contributor.
The individual would also be consulted as to the percentage of a full
tithe that he or she paid. Families usually made their contribution
under the name of the male spouse if there was one although some young
men contributed independently to the Church. The combination of the32
amount contributed with the percentage of this amount relative to a full
tithe yields an estimate of income. We made adjustments for those who
reported income in a particular year but for whom we did not have
percentages by averaging the percentage paid from other years.
Occupational data have been collected from each census manuscript,
available from 1850 to 1900. Occupations were transcribed into a
three—digit code that combined occupations that were essentially the
same, e.g., lawyer and attorney. We did not create an occupational
status scale. Rather, for purposes of analysis, these codes were
aggregated into four categories: white collar workers, managers, and
proprietors (W); farmers, ranchers, dairy owners, etc., (F); craft
workers (C); laborers, farm laborers and other unskilled occupations
(L). This left a heterogeneous mixture of occupations that were largely
service oriented, such as hotel clerks, policemen, lower level clerks,
etc., which we classified in a fifth group as service workers (S).
Both census and genealogical records provide place of birth and
age. When these sources disagreed, the genealogical record was used.
From these two records we could obtain most of the vital statistics of
interest, including birth, death, and marriage information, as well as
the implied information about household location at particular times,
family size and family structure. These records also provide sibling
names (linking brothers) and multiple marriage information (linking half
brothers).
We used place information to provide a record of residence and
internal migration and to provide an estimate of the length of time a
household had been within the economy (T). For analysis purposes, we33
consider only rural (R) and urban (U) residence where urban is defined
as Salt Lake County.
We have linked individuals through time and across records and we
have linked these individual histories by family relationship. The core
of the sample was created by linking census wealth records using name,
location, age, and birthplace data. We then added a random sample of
the households from each census year that did not appear in more than
one of these censuses. We separately coded links that were "certain
from those for which there were some discrepancies in name spellings or
age estimates between census years, uncertains." We were, however,
conservative in our efforts and subsequent analysis has shown no
statistically significant differences between "certains" and
"uncertains" and hence we no longer carry the coding distinguishing the
two. To this core of linked and randomly sampled individuals, we added
as many LDS financial records as we could, linked by name across the
records and through the years from 1855 to 1900. We then reversed the
procedure: first linking households in the Church financial records and
then adding as much census information as was possible.
We added to this sample, now linked through time and between census
and church financial records, records from either the censuses or
financial records that were potentially fathers and sons. We verified
these father-son links using the family vital statistic records from the
Genealogical Library. We then searched the family vital statistic
records for those in the core sample creating pointers linking those
within the sample who were either fathers and sons or brothers. In
addition, we added any records from the population data for those we34
could identify as sons or brothers of those in the sample by using the
family vital statistic information.
Not all family links between brothers occur with a link to a
father. Since we searched the family vital statistic records for those
in our sample, we would often find brothers without finding fathers, who
might have been dead or who might not have migrated to Utah with their
sons. This particular aspect of the sample means that the sibling
connections cover the full age range in each year of the sample and are
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of new households that were formed over the fifty-year period where we
observed the father for some years and then observed the father and son.
Because of the extended period over which we sampled, we also observed
fathers and sometimes sons who died and a small group of three
generation links.
We added to this linked data additional wealth data from the tax
assessments and probates as well as occupational data from the 1880 and
1900 censuses. For these records we have neither population data nor
random samples from population data. Rather we sought out only those
records for individuals already in our sample. Otherwise, however, we
have population data for wealth from 1850 to 1870 and income from 1855
to 1900.
When we added data, anomolies would appear. At each point we
purged from the data those links that became questionable with the new
information. Obvious checks included: records past death or for an
individual who was 'too old"; records prior to birth or for an
individual who was "too young'; the same name on multiple records from
the same source in the same year; substantial age inconsistencies.35
We believe that we have been fairly conservative at each point but
we should note that all linking is by names with the attendant problems
of misspelling and same names for different individuals. We tried to
avoid both problems by not selecting or subsequently eliminatinq those
with common names where the probability was high that there would be
several individuals with the same name (e.g., John Jones, James Green).
We have differentially coded "certain" family links from those that were
"less certain."
The completed data set is essentially a panel ,althoughan
individual need not appear in each year either because the individual
migrated in or formed a household later in the period; because the
individual migrated out or died during the period; or because we could
not make a link in a particular year. It is a panel with the unique
characteristic that it is drawn from a fifty-year history of an economy
and that it has immediate family links.